We publish this Newsletter periodically, on a time-permitting basis, and subject to our professional commitments to apprise clients and colleagues of recent developments in areas in which we are primarily engaged-- --FAA/NTSB/DOT, certification and enforcement, aircraft and equipment acquisition, sales and leasing, and airports matters. We provide this information, which has been derived from reliable sources and which we believe to be current at the time, but without liability therefor. We hope that you find AVIALEX ® interesting and informative. We would appreciate receiving your feedback with any suggestions or comments. If you know of anyone who might be interested in receiving copies, please FAX or Email their names and addresses to us. You may reproduce this Newsletter or use any information from it so long as you give us credit for same. (please see our copyright notice below).
WHILE WE'VE BEEN AWAY...
It has been over three years since we last published AVIALEX® in hard copy format. We developed our Website in 1996 and published a Website edition of the Newsletter in August 1997. Back issues of AVIALEX® are available on the Website. Publication has always been subject to our professional and travel commitments and needless to say, the latter half of the past three years have been very, very busy.
RECENT, AND NOT SO RECENT, DEVELOPMENTS:
We actually started Volume 4 in Autumn 1996--a time when there were a number of developments--legislative changes to the FAA's
mandate, promulgation of new policies on self-disclosure and sharing of information and a number of special Governmental studies in the aftermath of two major air carrier accidents. These developments were so rapidly changing that it rendered the Newsletter practically obsolete before it could even go to press. While there is nothing worse than delivering "yesterday's news" in a newsletter, let's take a look at what we consider the most significant developments that have had far-reaching consequences over the past several years and which will continue to affect what we do.
Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996
This comprehensive legislation was signed into law on October 9, 1996 (Pub. L. No. 104-264) and addresses, among other things, FAA reform, air safety, air transportation security and assistance to families of passengers involved in aviation accidents. Particularly noteworthy are the following:
1. Redefined FAA Mandate (Or, "No More Mr. Nice Guy)":
Safety and security are now the FAA's highest priorities. Gone is the "promotion and foster" mandate which had been contained in federal aviation legislation since 1926. (49 U.S.C.§§40101, 40104). In the aftermath of the Valujet tragedy, you probably recall then Secretary of Transportation Pena clamoring for legislative change because the dual mandate of promotion and safety were inherently confusing to FAA safety/inspection personnel. This was total bunk. I've never met an FAA employee who was ever confused or conflicted by the dual mandate. Safety has always been the primary objective. Besides, if we relied solely upon the FAA for the promotion and fostering of aviation, we would probably have all closed our doors and had to find other lines of work in other industries and professions. Be that as it may, this revised mandate has been chiefly responsible for our having been so busy and the delayed publication of this Newsletter.
2. Disclosure of Voluntarily-Provided Safety Information:
In past issues of AVIALEX®, we expressed great concerns over the releasability of information voluntarily self-disclosed to the FAA by air carriers and other air agencies. Under this legislation, and for the purpose of encouraging voluntary submission of safety and security information, the FAA has been directed not to disclose voluntarily-provided information...(here's the catch) if the FAA determines that doing so would inhibit further disclosure or interfere with security concerns. How the FAA will make this determination, or what guidelines it will use, are anyone's guess at this time. Needless to say, we stand by our prior recommendations, i.e., WHEN YOU SELF-DISCLOSE TO THE FAA, ANTICIPATE THAT WHATEVER YOU SAY, AND WHATEVER YOU SUBMIT (manuals, records, employee information, internal memoranda, and the like) WILL EVENTUALLY BE RELEASABLE AND MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC!
When furnishing the FAA with manuals, either in connection with initial certification, manual revisions, responding to LOI's or making self-disclosures, do it in writing. Please take a look at the language that we recommended including (see AVIALEX®, Volume 3). In a nutshell, it (1) identifies the information as being proprietary, constituting trade secret and/or commercial information, containing data, procedures and practices unique to the certificate holder which have been developed and/or which have evolved over a period of time based upon the certificate holder's experience, and are the product of the certificate holder's substantial investment, release of which would cause substantial harm to the certificate holder's present or future competitive position; (2) objects to the public availability and/or release of same; (3) seeks confidential treatment under 49 C.F.R. §7.69 and 49 U.S.C. Sec. 40115; (4) seeks confidential treatment of the names and identities of any employees identified in the disclosure under 49 C.F.R. §7.73; and (5) asserts that the continued viability and success of the FAA's self disclosure program requires that certificate holders be able to report safety concerns and possible discrepancies without fear that these reports will become matters of public record orotherwise disseminated to the public, thereby undermining the integrity of the self-disclosure program.
While we're on the subject of self-disclosure, FAA Advisory Circular ("AC") 120-56, cited in prior volumes of AVIALEX® has been canceled and, as of May 4, 1998, is now covered in AC 00-58. Clients frequently ask us for copies of the AC.
3. Security.
This is the FAA's number one battle cry. If you look at the numbers of FAA air carrier enforcement cases, you will see that the numbers of security cases far exceed operational and maintenance cases combined. The FAA has also adopted a "take no prisoners" stance--seeking maximum civil penalties for even the most inadvertent omission. This stance is not the product of any legislative change, but rather reflects the FAA's efforts to address Congressional, public and media concerns about aviation security.
However, the legislation has impacted air transportation security in requiring employment investigations (and even criminal history record checks, in some cases) for individuals who screen passengers or handle baggage and cargo. (For a disturbing thought, however, see Aviation Daily, February 10, 1997, page 229--in a report provided to the FAA by Embry-Riddle: America's frontline defender against aviation terrorism earns $5.25 an hour and is likely to be quitting in a few months....He is also not very likely to recognize a gun or knife on his X-ray screen, or a radio-size bomb. The legislation also authorized FAA to create and evaluate computer-assisted passenger-screening and profiling programs linked to other intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Needless to say, this has caused concern among many legal and constitutional experts. The legislation also requires air carriers to conduct periodic vulnerability assessments of their own security systems and the FAA will perform periodic audits of these assessments.
4. Pilot Record Improvements Act:
Air carriers are now required to obtain certain information for pilot applicants--FAA records, current airman certificates, FAA enforcement actions, records from any air carrier or other person who has employed the applicant withing the previous five years, records pertaining to training, qualification, proficiency or professional competence, and disciplinary or other employment records. The pilot applicant is required to provide written consent for the release of these records. Pilot records must be retained for at least five years. No legal action may be brought by an applicant against an air carrier requesting the records, a person who has complied with a request for records, a person who has entered information contained in the records or an employee who has dealt with these records.
5. Child Pilot Safety:
This is the "Jessica" bill--prohibiting any pilot in command who permits an uncertificated person to control an aircraft if that person is attempting to set a record or engage in aeronautical competition. Unfortunately, no amount of legislation will serve as an adequate substitute for good sense (or lack thereof).
6. Family Assistance:
While Congress eliminated the FAA's dual mandate, it imposed an additional mandate to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), making it the lead agency to assist family members of passengers involved in an aviation accident. In the course of its accident investigation, the NTSB will ensure that families are briefed and permitted to attend any public hearings. It remains to be seen as to whether this new role for the NTSB will in any way conflict with its primary duties and responsibilities of accident investigation and determination of probable cause. We suspect that this may be a problem area in the future.
"Hoover Bill"--Proposed Legislation Concerning FAA Emergency Enforcement Actions.
FAA certificate actions (i.e., suspensions and revocations) are appealable to the NTSB. In Fiscal Year 1989, the NTSB had a total caseload of 1,814 cases, of which only 66 were emergency actions. While the total caseload has gone down each year, the number of FAA emergency actions has increased dramatically. In FY 1996, the total caseload was only 682 cases, but emergency actions accounted for 178--roughly 35% of the total! For FY 1997, the total caseload will remain approximately the same, but that emergency actions will experience another 5% increase.
The FAA's emergency authority is extraordinary. Unlike normal certificate actions, emergency actions are immediately effective--i.e., the certificate holder is grounded even while an appeal is pending. This has proven to be extremely burdensome, not only for the affected certificate holder, but for the NTSB, which must devote significant portions of its already-limited resources to assigning the matter to a judge, scheduling a hearing (usually in some outlying area), conducting the hearing, and processing and deciding the matter on appeal, all within a statutory 60-day period.
While the FAA should and must have emergency authority to curtail unsafe activities, the FAA has been less than judicious in its exercise of its emergency authority. The FAA frequently initiates emergency actions when no emergency exists or in situations in which enforcement action is not even warranted in the first place. Moreover, there is no uniformity within the FAA. Some regions issue a higher percentage of emergency actions to total actions than others--the "winners" being Southwest and Western-Pacific.
Senator James M. Inhoffe of Oklahoma introduced legislation during the last session--FAA Emergency Revocation Act of 1997--under which the FAA, while maintaining its emergency authority, will have to establish before the NTSB within four days of its issuance of an emergency action that a true emergency exists. The bill was narrowly defeated in the Senate by a 51-46 vote. However, as we go to press the bill is about to be reintroduced. We'll keep you posted on this. If you're in support of this measure, you might drop a line to the Senator or phone his office (202) 224-4721.
MORE ON SELF DISCLOSURE and NASA AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING PROGRAM; DOWNLOAD ADVISORY CIRCULARS AND FORMS.
In prior issues have spoken about the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting Program. Under this program, if an occurrence is voluntarily reported to NASA within 10 days, and certain conditions are met, the FAA will be precluded from imposing any disciplinary sanction. AC 00-46C, cited in earlier issues has been superseded by AC 00-46D. Moreover, the prior ASRP Report Form has been revised. There are now four Forms: one for pilot/operational discrepancies; one for maintenance; one for cabin service personnel and one for ATC personnel. Form are available for download from our Download page
Remember, if the act that you wish to report consisted of criminal activity or was deliberate or intentional, do not report it! The regulations and the AC's do not provide immunity for criminal, deliberate or intentional acts. Moreover, upon its receipt of an ASRP Report evidencing criminal activity, NASA will contact law enforcement authorities. Read the AC's!
In addition to the programs covered by AC's 00-46D 00-58, there are some demonstration programs which are particularly noteworthy:
1. FOQA:
The Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) Program involves review of flight recorder (DFDR) data by airline safety personnel and voluntary sharing of same with the FAA. This demonstration program has been conducted over the past three years with major airline participants. While the primary emphasis on this program is to catch safety problems rather than wrongdoers, there are at present no permanent statutory or regulatory protections against the initiation of FAA enforcement action. Moreover, there are no protections against the public availability of information (under the Freedom of Information Act) furnished by FOQA-participating carriers. It remains to be seen whether the FAA will address these concerns to the satisfaction of both the carriers and the pilots unions. In December 1998, the FAA Administrator announced a statement of policy to refrain from using FOQA-derived data for enforcement purposes, except in egregious cases--defined using criteria listed in Paragraph 9 of AC 00-46D, i.e.: (1) nature of the violation; (2) whether the violation was inadvertent or deliberate; (3) the certificate holder's level of experience and responsibility; (4) attitude of the violator; (5) the hazard to safety of others which should have been foreseen; (6) action taken by employer or other government authority; (7) length of time which has elapsed since violation; (8) the certificate holder's use of the certificate; (9) the need for special deterrent action in a particular
regulatory area, or segment of the aviation community; and (10) presence of any factors involving national interest, such as the use of aircraft for criminal purposes. Maybe we're just paranoid, but utilizing these factors, the FAA can argue that pretty much anything is egregious! We'll hear more on this in the coming months and years, for sure.
2. GAIN:
The Global Aviation and Information Network (GAIN) program calls for development of databases for analysis and sharing from numerous sources, including FOQA and the NASA ASRP. The FAA's call for the development of a prototype GAIN system was published in the Federal Register on May 10, 1996. Again, as with FOQA, there are no ironclad guarantees that voluntarily-provided safety information would be exempt from disclosure, either under FOIA or in other court proceedings.
3. ASAP (AC 120-66)
In 1997, the FAA issued this Advisory Circular providing guidance for the establishment of Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP) entered into by carriers and repair stations, employee groups (i.e., flight crewmembers, mechanics, flight attendants, and dispatchers) and the FAA and which are intended to generate safety information that might not otherwise be obtainable. ASAP is intended to serve as a vehicle for employees of carriers and repair stations "to identify and report safety issues to management and the FAA for resolution without fear of punitive legal enforcement action being taken against them, under certain circumstances." (emphasis added).
ASAP provides for an "enforcement-related incentive", an assurance that "lesser" (Ed. note: as opposed to "no") enforcement action will be used to address violations of the FAR's to encourage participation by employees. Apparent violations by employees disclosed through safety-related reports will ordinarily be addressed with administrative action (i.e., letters of warning, reprimand or correction) provided that the apparent violations do not:
- involve deliberate misconduct;
- a substantial disregard for safety or security;
- criminal conduct; or
- conduct that raises a question of a lack of qualification.
Sounds good--but here's the catch: Check out the definition of "substantial disregard": ...in the case of a certificate holder, the act or failure to act was a substantial deviation from the degree of care, judgment and responsibility normally expected of a person holding a certificate with that type, quality and level of experience, knowledge and proficiency. ...in the case the violator is not a certificate holder, the act or failure to act was a substantial deviation from the degree of care and diligence expected of a reasonable person in those circumstances.
As we read these definitions, any violation is arguably in "substantial disregard". And while we're on the subject of catches, bear in mind that administrative actions against individual certificate holders--pilots, flight engineers, dispatchers and mechanics--remain on one's record for a period of two years. However, administrative actions against air carriers, repair stations and other air agencies are never expunged!
Don't get us wrong. We're not advocating that a carrier or repair station not avail itself of ASAP. We think that the program is a good start, but much remains to be done.
While you're checking out the AC, note that it a sample ASAP memorandum of understanding is contained in it.
And finally, there's some recent (and good) news concerning the releasability of ASAP data. Within the past couple a months, a federal judge has ruled that safety-related ASAP information can be protected from use in litigation. In that case, the plaintiffs sought the release of 23 documents pertaining to a carrier's ASAP, which the court determined were subject to a qualified privilege. While protecting the data against disclosure to the plaintiffs, the judge nonetheless required that the documents be furnished to the court for its review and inspection.
Undoubtedly, there will be more ASAP developments in the courts and in the enforcement arena in the years to come.
ON THE SUBJECT OF EXPUNCTION...
we receive numerous inquiries concerning the FAA's expunction policy. That policy is contained in the Federal Register at 56 FR 55788 (October 29, 1991). Under this policy, records of legal enforcement (suspension and civil penalty) actions will be maintained for a period of five years. Records of revocation actions will be maintained indefinitely. Cases closed with no enforcement action will be expunged within 90 days.
However this policy pertains only to enforcement actions against "individuals" (as opposed to "persons", as defined in 49 U.S.C.). Thus, records of actions, legal or administrative, against carriers, repair stations, manufacturers, aircraft and other products, and air agencies are not subject to this policy and are never expunged. Think about this before you agree to accept a letter of reprimand or warning on behalf of your company.
FAA PRESS RELEASES ON ENFORCEMENT MATTERS
For the past couple of years, the FAA has been routinely issuing press releases on initiated safety and security enforcement actions that seek civil penalties of $50,000 or more, has maintained a dedicated safety information page on its Website providing information previously only available through FOIA, including enforcement actions, accident, incident data and other "safety data" that the FAA may chose to add.
Aside from the fact that data on past accidents and incidents and civil penalties may not necessarily be reliable indicia of future safety, carriers that report more data to the FAA may be perceived as "less safe". Moreover at $11,000 per regulatory violation, with multiple violations cited and each day and flight constituting separate offenses, it doesn't take much to drive civil penalties up in excess of $50,000. Most damaging of all, however, is the FAA's decision to issue pressreleases on "newly-issued actions" based solely upon its own investigation (which oftentimes has been less than adequate and without any meaningful input by the carrier) and prior to the conduct of an informal conference and/or any adjudication of the issues. We submit that this is counter productive. Carriers may become reluctant to report discrepancies, and the FAA, having "let the toothpaste out of the tube" and publicized the initiation of the action, will be reluctant to settle the case, even in instances in which the carrier has effectively rebutted the charges. The FAA cannot create and foster programs such as FOQA, GAIN and ASAP, and at the same time ballyhoo its enforcement process.
GAO REPORT ON FAA ENFORCEMENT--IS THE FAA TOO SOFT?As most of the aviation trade publications have reported, the GAO's recent report on the FAA enforcement program was extremely critical. Essentially, the GAO's criticisms were four-fold: (1) FAA Inspectors don't write up every violation; (2) FAA legal doesn't always follow the investigating district offices' recommendations and tends to be more lenient; (3) FAA legal then settles the cases for substantially lower penalties; and (4) the FAA fails to distinguish major from minor violations.
With the exception of failing to distinguish between major and minor violations, reading the GAO report could give the impression that the FAA is essentially "selling the farm" and not doing its job. Maybe I'm doing something wrong, but in my 4&Mac189; years with the FAA, 4&Mac189; years with a major air carrier and 18 years in private practice, I haven't seen any evidence of FAA "selling the farm". If anything, the FAA has, of late, gone from vigorous to downright draconian--particularly with respect to air carriers and air agencies.
Certainly, the FAA must have enforcement powers, but enforcement should only be a last resort measure. The FAA's primary mission is to ensure compliance with the multitude of statutes and regulations governing air safety. In the vast majority of case, compliance can be better achieved with a carrot rather than a stick. Most certificate holders--pilots, flight engineers, mechanics, air carriers, repair stations and other agencies--want to comply and work very hard at compliance. Impositions of civil penalties and certificate actions for what in most cases are the results of simple human errors, as opposed to intentional wanton conduct or a grandiose malevolent scheme, does little, if anything to ensure compliance.
The aviation industry is safe because those in it strive to make it safe as a matter of professional responsibility and pride, and not because the FAA suspends certificates or imposes civil penalties.
The reality is that the enforcement process plays a very large part of the FAA's overall agenda. As the GAO report indicates, for the fiscal years 1990-96, the FAA opened nearly 110,000 enforcement cases, resulting from some two million inspections and other complaints. At the end of Fiscal Year 1996, FAA had about 3,000 inspection staff (Flight Standards and Civil Aviation Security), with a budget of $535 million! This is a "big business" for the agency, and it's going to get even bigger--not only in response to the two major airline disasters of 1996, but now in response to GAO criticism.
While the maximum civil penalties that can be imposed by the FAA are $11,000 per regulatory violation for air carriers and $1,100 for all others, give the multiplicity and complexity of these regulations, one simple act or omission can result in multiple regulatory violations. Moreover, while the FAA has traditionally confined certificate actions to general aviation operators and for only the most egregious alleged violations, don't be surprised if the FAA takes a another look at this "remedy" in air carrier cases.
"STREAMLINED"ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
Last year the FAA issued Compliance/Enforcement Bulletin No. 98-1, attempting to implement a process to permit FAA inspectors and Special Agents to issue "on the spot" administrative enforcement actions. This program never became operational, primarily due to vociferous opposition by the aviation community. However, a revised "streamlined" process appears to be in the works. While it has not been officially promulgated, and while there are little, if any, specifics, we have serious concerns about the FAA's "Son of Traffic Ticket" Program:
- Who is the alleged violator? An individual certificate holder, or the employer, such as an air carrier or repair station?
- Are violations by individuals imputed to the employer?
- Are employees of air carriers and air agencies the de facto agents for service of administrative enforcement actions on their employers?
- Is the prescribed seven-day response period sufficient?
- If the "violator" responds to and disagrees with the warning notice, what happens? Is there any right to appeal or other recourse?
- The FAA inspectors and investigating personnel do not have to gather and evaluate evidence before taking the action.
- Will the FAA revise its expunction program to permit expunction of records of administrative actions in air carrier and air agency cases?
- Will this program be confined to operations and maintenance cases or will it extend to HazMat and security cases?
NOW THAT WE'VE SPENT THE LAST SEVERAL PAGES (AND SEVERAL MINUTES OF YOUR TIME) "VENTING" ABOUT THE FEDS, LET'S CHANGE DIRECTION. As aviation professionals, we naturally spend a lot of time in the air. In fact, one of the reasons why we got into this industry is because we like airplanes and love to fly. However, this does not immunize us from many of the frustrations inherent in air travel. Residing and working in San Francisco, and being totally dependent upon San Francisco International Airport (in 1998 I averaged 1.5 days per week traveling), the sixth busiest airport in the country, and seventh in the world, and practically the first in terms of delays, prompted me to write the following editorial. I hope you enjoy it.
An Air Traveler's Ninety Minutes in Tibet
Air travel. Sitting aboard the pride of Boeing, a brand new 777, viewing Seven Years in Tibet as the in-flight movie. Well "in-flight movie" is not entirely accurate. You see, for the first 90 minutes of the film we were not in flight--we hadn't even taken off. Instead, this 300-passenger aviation technological marvel was parked, engines off, on a de-icing pad at Denver International Airport waiting to be cleared to its destination. De-icing pad on a balmy 60 degree March day? Dare you hazard a guess as to where this flight was bound?
The flight attendant, in a manner which seemed painfully and embarrassingly rehearsed, informed us that the flight was delayed due weather conditions at the destination--El Nino. But El Nino certainly was not to blame for this delay. Weather at the destination, as verified by a short phone call home, was just fine--very similar to Denver's. What was that destination airport? You've got it--SFO.
An isolated instance? No.
How about a recent return from New York? The flight was uneventful, landing mid-day in Oakland. The only problem was thatthe flight was not destined for Oakland but for San Francisco. However, delays at SFO necessitated a landing at Oakland for refueling. The good news was that our Boeing 767 was able to fuel and depart for SFO before the 747 that had followed us in for the same reason.
I'm not trying to impress anyone with my "war stories". Many of you have probably experienced far worse. Rather, these are but examples of what travelers coming to and going from SFO can expect. I'm just one of the 33 million-plus passengers who used the Airport last year. And, at the rate things are going, there is little, if any, chance of any improvement on the horizon.
The instinctive response may be to blame the airlines--after all, they're the ones that we've paid to take us from Point A to Point B. But don't, because it's not their fault. Don't blame the FAA whose Air Traffic Control System has been in dire need of overhaul for the past two decades. And don't even blame the weather--after all, SFO operates under visual flight rules conditions the majority of the time. The world famous San Francisco fog rarely sojourns 13 miles south of the Golden Gate. The problem stems from an antiquated airport runway layout which is incapable of serving present-day air transportation demands. In fairness to all, those demands, over the past decade and a half, have increased logarithmically, even beyond the airline industry's and the Airport's wildest expectations.
While the Mayor's Office and the Airports Commission are oohing and aahing over their soon-to-be-completed 2.4 billion dollar self-aggrandizing monument, the new international terminal, ballyhooing the installation of digital TV cameras as an early warning system for adverse weather, and recently spent some $40,000 on a shindig to celebrate the opening of the new rental car facility, the fact remains that these airport improvements, as impressive as they may be, have been done "bass-ackwards." Yes, folks, we'll have a beautiful terminal--all that marble, glass and stainless steel, the shops and the ambiance of a world-class international airport; we'll have BART and people movers and a modern, centralized rental car facility. But what good are these things if you can't take off or land? None of these improvements will alleviate the bottle neck--the stifling flow of air traffic in and out of SFO.
True, the present international terminal facilities are not only inadequate, but at some times of the day (and in particular, the night) are a total disgrace, the undertaking of substantial and costly terminal improvements prior to alleviating the choke-hold on airport operations was less than prudent. Terminal improvements without the necessary "air side" improvements don't make sense.
SFO's runway layout was designed in the 1930's. While it may have been state of the art then--when the most advanced aircraft flying were 30-seat DC-3's--today it is woefully obsolete with two sets of intersecting parallel runways that cannot safely permit two simultaneous take offs or landings in other than ideal weather conditions. Runways that were 750 feet apart may have been adequate for 95-foot wingspanned DC-3's, but are too close to handle simultaneous operations of today's aircraft. A Boeing 747-400 has a wingspan of 213 feet. If you do the math, that leaves only 537 feet, wingtip to wingtip. What is now the world's seventh and the nation's sixth busiest airport's high volume of traffic, is close to number 1 in delays--regardless of weather. Imagine driving to the present-day San Francisco Metropolitan Area utilizing only roadways built in the 1930's--impossible!
Delays are not confined to inbound traffic. Inbound delays create a "domino effect", translating into outbound delays--not only at SFO but at other locations. The aircraft used for that 4:00 p.m. LAX-SFO flight, began its day early that morning and may have had numerous trips through SFO before flying to LAX. When you check in for that flight at LAX at 3:30 and are told that the aircraft has not only not yet arrived at LAX, but it hasn't yet arrived at its preceding destination, you can be pretty sure that the aircraft and its preceding flights have fallen victim to SFO's flow control procedures imposed by the airport's inability to accommodate scheduled inbound traffic. The inherent advantage of air travel dissipates when renting a car and driving up I-5 will get you back home sooner than your flight!
Obviously, this is frustrating for travelers, business and leisure alike. It's also frustrating for the airlines and their personnel who are on the "front lines", who having no control of the situation and no means of avoiding or mitigating it, are attempting to placate frustrated and angry passengers. It is no wonder that SFO has the dubious distinction of being one of seven sites targeted by the Federal government to crack down on "air rage"--crimes where unruly passengers assault or threaten airline employees or fellow passengers.
Frustration aside, chronic delays are economically and environmentally wasteful. Consider the lost time and productivity of the business traveler; consider the leisure traveler whose vacation plans are ruined; consider the airlines which cannot efficiently utilize their aircraft and personnel; consider the additional fuel burn; and consider the effect of these delays on motor vehicle traffic in and around the Airport.
Frustration, economics, and environmental concerns aside, there is another factor-- Safety. Consider but a few of the articles on appearing in the San Francisco Chronicle over the past year:
- "International Pilots Rank SFO Unsafe";
- "Only U.S. Airport on List of 15 Hit with 'Black Star'";
- "Pilots Say SFO Runways Too Close for Comfort";
- "Pilot Complaints Show Fear of Parallel Landings at SFO".
Although airport officials and the FAA are quick to point out that the parallel runways close proximity to each other have never caused a major accident, that is little comfort when pilots state "it is pure insanity to be almost holding hands with a 747 two miles from touchdown" and that "SFO is an accident is waiting to happen". Some argue that this congestion could be remedied if SFO were confined to international traffic and domestic flights were diverted to Oakland and San Jose. This is not workable. A good percentage of SFO traffic is connecting. If SFO were confined to international traffic, how would people connect? Fly to Oakland or San Jose and take a bus? No way! That's a lot of busses and the "connection times" would be horrendous. The fact is that people want to fly into SFO, not Oakland, not San Jose. The current and projected volumes of traffic at the three airports simply reflect this demand. That's why of the total 33 million-plus emplaning and deplaning passengers at SFO in 1998, over 27 million were domestic travelers. (In other words, at present levels of traffic, less than 1/5 of the total number of SFO passengers will use the new international terminal!).
The only solution is a substantial overhaul of the airport's runway layout--constructing runways that are at least 4,500 feet apart to accommodate increased traffic flow, allowing parallel landings under less than ideal weather conditions. Unfortunately this will require additional bay fill, something that, at first blush, sets off a number of environmental alarms. After all, the Bay has been sacrificed, filled, reduced, and plundered throughout the past century, all in the name of development. In the past 150 years, the size of the Bay has been reduced by one-third.
With responsible airport development, these alarms need not be sounded. This is one instance in which what is good for the Airport, the airlines, economic interests and travelers, can also be good for the entire Bay Area and extremely beneficial to the environment.
The Airports Commission has proposed what is perhaps one of the largest and most ambitious mitigation measures in U.S. history, offering to purchase 29,000 acres (45 square miles) of South Bay salt ponds (which in and of themselves are ecologically disastrous) and restore them to their original wetland states, in return for 1,100 to 1,300 acres of additional bay fill needed for this project. About 80 percent of South Bay wetlands heretofore lost over the years will be recovered. From a purely environmental standpoint, this is a phenomenal rate of return--getting 29,000 acres for 1,100 to 1,300. In addition to reducing endemic chronic delays, the runway improvements will move final approach paths for incoming jet traffic further out over the Bay, reducing noise levels for South Bay and Peninsula communities.
The one major corporate salt harvester opposes this measure. However, that opposition appears to have a unidimensional basis--$$$ for the "taking" of the salt ponds and the harvesting operation (which the Chronicle [September 23, 1998] has described as "anachronistic" and of "low economic value").
If the parties can agree upon some reasonable compensation, this mitigation measure will clearly be a "win-win" solution. However, whether or not any economic remuneration paid to the salt harvester is sufficient in its eyes, there is no viable alternative.
The fact of the matter is that San Francisco Bay Area has long ago grown out its major airport. There is no going back. The lack of an airport that adequately, efficiently and safely serves our needs, will in the long run, hurt all of us. No one in the Bay Area is immune. Everybody flies at one time or another.
HOUSEKEEPING..., and a word from our sponsor:
For those of you who "surf the web", you may have already noticed our home page (www.avialex.com). In addition to our direct mailings of this Newsletter, we post it on our web site, along with past issues and other information that we believe may be of interest to our clients and members of the aviation community. The web site also provides links to other aviation and legal websites. Our Email address, law@avialex.com supersedes and replaces the Prodigy and Compuserve addresses listed in prior issues.
